Today’s Smokejumper
A seasonal round’s
ruminations.
These
are interesting times for the USFS Smokejumper program and its employees. This
piece reflects a few of my personal opinions and addresses some of the
challenges and obstacles that I feel we face today. I am in no way speaking for
others and I don’t necessarily share the views of anyone within the program or
otherwise.
I’m
not one for exact statistics, figures or percentages and I’m going to limit
this piece to generalities, perspectives and conjecture. I believe that one can
gain a lot of insight on an issue by simply looking at trends and by using a
more heuristic and humanistic approach to an analysis.
Personal Background
I
began working for the Forest Service in the summer of 2000 with the Bitterroot
National Forest on the Darby Ranger District. It was a busy season and I was
exposed to the myriad of components that make up wildland fire. Over the next 3
years I worked on two different Hotshot crews; Sawtooth and Bonneville. My
primary role on both crews was as a sawyer. By the time I left Bonneville in
‘03 I was a fairly competent C faller and had a good understanding of fire
behavior and suppression strategies. I rookied for the Missoula Smokejumpers in
2004 and have remained there until today with the exception of two 120 day
details; one to the Redmond Smokejumpers and the other to West Yellowstone. At
this point I have roughly 150 total jumps and just shy of 60 operational fire
jumps. I’ve pursued my overhead qualifications aggressively and am currently an
ICT3 trainee, Division trainee and Helibase Manager trainee. I have a handful
of single resource qualifications, including ICT4, Task Force Leader and
Helicopter Manager. Over the past several years I’ve averaged in the
neighborhood of 40-60 days working outside of the smokejumper program on
overhead assignments, helicopter details or on miscellaneous details.
During
the winter I’ve complimented my fire skills by working in the ski industry. I
worked for the Snowbird Ski Patrol for 6 years before moving on to Snowcat and
Heli-Ski, guiding in both Utah and Nevada for another 4 years. I was employed
as a lead guide, avalanche forecaster and assistant operations manager. In 2010
I took a job with the Bridger Bowl Ski Patrol in Bozeman and currently work there
as a senior patroller, assistant avalanche forecaster/technician, and avalanche
search dog handler. I also work intermittently with the Gallatin National
Forest Avalanche Forecast Center and I volunteer for Gallatin County Search and
Rescue, primarily as an avalanche search dog handler and certifier. In my free
time I am a freelance photographer specializing in commercial and editorial
portraiture and fashion. My degree from the University of Montana is in
Financial Management with an emphasis in Investment Banking.
I
give you my background simply to illustrate that I have a fairly well-rounded
and somewhat unique perspective on some of the current issues we face as
smokejumpers. I run a small business, I work in technical environments outside
of fire, I’ve had significant medical training and experience and I’ve done a lot
of risk management.
Smokejumpers
While
most reading this will have a firm grasp of the modern and traditional fire
environments, I think a brief overview is in order to adequately understand the
challenges we face today as jumpers. Things have changed quite a bit in the
last 10 years; more so since the programs inception. The “bread and butter” fires
of smokejumping’s past, primarily wilderness fires and remote initial attack
fires requiring 2-10 people are less common today. For these remote and
isolated fires of day’s past, there were few alternatives for land managers
other than using jumpers. Smokejumper bases were staffed heavily. Missoula employed
close to 200 jumpers at times during the 60’s and 70’s. It wasn’t rare for jumpers to get 20 or
more operational jumps in a year. Most jumpers were employed seasonally, and
the core group was primarily young, single men. Many were students and very few stayed on for more than the
operational season. Many of those only jumped for a handful of years before
moving into another career.
Now,
contrast that with today’s smokejumper, our current staffing levels and the
broad range of missions jumpers are used for today, including all risk incident
command, initial attack fire suppression, district project and fuels work,
prescribed fire, fireline leadership, supervision and mentorship, teaching, training
and more. Many wilderness areas across the country now employ fire-use
management principles and often forest heli-tack crews tackle many of the local
“remote” fires. Today many jumpers average only 6-12 operational jumps a year,
and base staffing across the program is at an all time low while retention
remains very high. For the first time ever the Redmond base employs fewer
jumpers than the North Cascades base. Missoula currently staffs in the
neighborhood of 60 jumpers. The vast majority of the national program is
comprised of career appointed men and women with children. Many of those folks,
if not funded for year-round work, are either actively or passively looking for
year-round work. Many, if not the majority, have college degrees, many with
post-grad degrees.
The
Missoula program, of which I’m the most familiar, is a strong and successful program.
Dozens of well-rounded recruits with multiple years of hotshot, heli-tack and
engine experience apply annually for a few sought after positions. Attrition
during rookie training is low, and new jumpers typically stay for years or
longer after their first season. The base itself retains a modern esprit de
corps, with strong work ethic, drive, humility and dedication.
Current Fire Behavior
and Initial Attack
Approximately
half of the fires I’ve responded to as a jumper have been large, aggressive,
emerging fires. The days of the “two-manner” are, more or less, gone. Today, we
often jump fires as a crew, ordering additional jumpers from surrounding bases
to support the effort if needed. I won’t get into forest management or beetle
kill or fuel densities on our National Forests; it suffices to say that today’s
fires require early detection, early prioritization of both fires and responding
resources, and man-power for an initial attack to be successful.
An
enormous change and challenge is the amount of urban interface in our forests
today. Values at risk have escalated significantly. Managers will wait longer
to dispatch limited resources to small remote fires when the possibility exists
that an undetected fire will show itself later in the burn period, potentially
threatening a community. Due to this simple fact, fires are not always attacked
as quickly as they could be. Prioritization of resources and fires becomes a complicated
dance resulting in delayed dispatches for initial attack resources. The result
being that fires become more established before we arrive.
Now
that I’ve given some background regarding how the fire environment has changed and
how our roles as jumpers have changed, we can take a critical look at our program.
Are we adequately assessing our capabilities to handle these new challenges? If
not, how can we adapt to that always-changing end-goal? Does our program meet
the needs of today’s fire managers and our other users? Are we adequately
diversified enough to handle the broad range of all-risk assignments for which
we may be used? Are we skilled enough leaders for the roles we may be asked to
fill? How can we continue to retool ourselves to meet the needs of the future?
I’m
going to address three fundamental problems that I think we, as jumpers, need
to address in order for our program to move successfully into the future, and ultimately
to thrive in the future. These problems are an over qualified and under-compensated
workforce. Understaffing and how it relates to what we not so affectionately
call, “lockdown”; (resulting in decreased crew experience, lost training
opportunities and a lack of relationship building with our users). And finally the actual parachute system
itself; the storied round versus ram-air (“square”) debate.
An
Overqualified and Under-compensated Workforce
A primary
component of the smokejumpers mission today involves a lot of incident
management and leadership on fires. Often, when we jump these emerging
incidents, we’re not so much “pounding line”, as we are setting up the Incident
Command System (ICS); coming up with the strategies and plans to begin the
process of extended attack. We staff every airplane in Missoula with a Type 3 Incident
Commander. On any given plane load we also have multiple Division and Task Force
qualified leaders, EMTs and paramedics, heli-tack, C-fallers, the list is long.
Even first year jumpers often get tasked with Incident Command responsibilities
and we all take on increasingly challenging logistical assignments, ie.. gps
recons, mapping, radio operations and intelligence gathering, etc. When the ordered
resources arrive, typically during the second operational period we plug them
in quickly, efficiently and safely.
The
“manpower” of the jump base is at the GS 5, 6 and to some extent the 7 levels. Because
this “job” has turned into a career for most people, attrition and turnover has
dropped to just shy of non-existent. Jumpers are remaining at the GS 6, both
temporary and seasonal, level for literally decades. If a “6” is motivated, it
is not hard to have the equivalent skills and qualifications, (if not more),
than some of the base leadership. Additionally, many of our 5s and 6s actually spend
more time out on fires during the season. They don’t have the base supervisory
responsibilities that require time at station. These “entry level” smokejumpers
are filling any number of supervisory and overhead positions on large, dynamic
and complex fires. We all still enjoy, in fact, love, the line digging aspect
of the job; and don’t get me wrong, even our GS 8s and above still dig a lot of
line every summer. All are still encouraged however, and at some level expected,
to be pursuing qualifications and overhead positions on fires. The first speech
a rookie receives upon completion of training reflects this attitude; the
expectation being, “that you will become a leader in the national fire
program.”
At
my experience level, 8 years after becoming a GS 6, I’m competing with probably
close to 30+ other extremely qualified jumpers with an equal amount of
experience, time-in-grade and qualifications for a seasonal GS 7 appointment in
Missoula. Most have ~15 years of fire experience on engines, hotshot crews, and
~8+ years as jumpers. Most are married with kids. The current system of
compensation is flawed and woefully inadequate. We need to be compensated for
our skills, motivation, drive and leadership in the fire community. This summer
I was supervising Task Force trainee’s that were GS 12’s making probably 3
times more than I was! Is it so unreasonable to think that if I’m managing
close to 200 people on an active division with significant values at risk that
I should at least be compensated as well as a Type 2 Crewboss? Compound that
with the liability insurance that we’re all encouraged to carry, as our agency
won’t necessarily support us legally, and it literally becomes somewhat asinine
to even want to pursue those qualifications and the accompanying responsibilities.
And yet all of us do it. It is expected of us.
I believe
the BLM program has a slightly better system, with reward-based upgrades as
people meet certain leadership criteria. In our organization, temporary 120-day
upgrades based solely on qualifications being pursued/attained, seems like a
start. While we give out a few every year, they should be widespread. Do they even
cost the base much out of pocket during a moderate to busy fire season when the
majority of our personnel’s wages are covered by fire dollars?
To add
insult to injury, many of us are not even eligible for basic jobs inside fire
program leadership outside of the smokejumper program due to the simple fact
that we lack time-in-grade at the GS 7 level.
Staffing Levels
and “Lockdown”
Many
forest managers still aren’t using smokejumpers to our full potential. Some
Fire Management Officers still think that our core mission is to put out small,
remote wilderness fires. Some fail to realize that we are very experienced
“teams” that may be a solution to a multitude of fire and all risk problems. Some
fail to realize the extent of our individual supervisory capabilities and qualifications.
Most districts are facing significant financial constraints, resulting in slashed
equipment budgets and personnel staffing.
This is widespread throughout the country and on almost every National Forest.
These districts may have had 5 engines and an IA crew several years ago, but today
are severely “hamstrung”, with minimal personnel to support only a few engines.
Smokejumpers could easily fill some of these shortages on a call-when-needed
basis.
So
why are some managers failing to realize what an asset the smokejumper program
could be for them? Simply put, we fail to build strong relationships with our
users. Furthermore, we fail to educate them on our revised mission and our current
capabilities.
When
we actually initial attack small fires we are extremely self-sufficient. It is
both our strength and our weakness.
Managers order us because they have limited resources on hand, they know
we will solve their problem efficiently and cost effectively, and they know we require
minimal logistical support. We leave almost as silently as we drop in;
typically submitting a fireman’s report with a handshake for a job well done. One
could contrast that to an extended attack overhead assignment, where a jumper
works hand-in-hand with dozens of fire managers from around the country. A smokejumper
has the opportunity to form exponentially more relationships with managers than
one would be able to make on initial attack fires during the same time period;
all in an operational and environmental context. As overhead we get to “prove”
ourselves, and be mentored and mentor others, both personally and
professionally on these assignments.
There
is no reason for not pursuing these overhead opportunities at all cost! These
relationships are instrumental for growing Smokejumper program support and are
key to increased smokejumper use as we move into the future. The added value is
that our jumpers, which are now getting tasked with taking on more responsibilities
on these larger initial attack fires, get hands-on experience on well-organized
fires from experienced trainers. In my experience, the only way to become a
smart, confident, respected leader is to practice those skills and continually
expose oneself to the ICS environment. If we are getting used less as traditional
smokejumpers we need to diversify as firefighters.
“Lockdown.”
Overqualified and underpaid GS 6’s literally cringe when we hear the word. Quite
simply, it means that the local or regional coordination center has deemed
smokejumpers more valuable than overhead, and has closed the door to all training
and supervisory opportunities. Lockdown eliminates a dozen or more significant
training and relationship building opportunities annually for our team alone. The
coordination center wants smokejumpers staffing aircraft, and I whole-heartedly
agree with this. Why would you have 26 seats on aircraft sitting on the ramp with
only 20 jumpers available to fill those seats? The simple solution is to hire more
GS5/GS6 temporary and permanent seasonal jumpers and request boosts more
frequently and earlier. When national coordination centers come to the
realization that there is a national shortage of smokejumpers, we will get the
Washington Office’s attention. We
need our numbers back to where they were historically if we want to be used in
every capacity and to our full capability.
Personally,
I want to spend as much time as possible on fire during the season in a diverse
range of positions. The only way I can close the financial gap between my “realized”
value and my income, (due to being overqualified and undercompensated), is to
be on fires during the fire season. The more time I spend on fire, the more
money I make. The more experience I gain, the more qualifications I can pursue,
the more competence I will have as a leader on fires and at the base, and the
more relationships I will form that will benefit the base in both the short and
long-term. You can’t limit ambitious people on the team that strive to branch
out, both personally and professionally as smokejumpers, without having a
direct negative impact on the greater program. We need this job to be flexible
enough to provide us the opportunity to do both.
There
are always jumpers that request to be available locally, or have family
obligations, or simply don’t want to pursue project fires and details and would
rather “jump” fires. Increasing the number of entry-level smokejumpers would support
this core initial attack force, while allowing more senior members to pursue qualifications
while building relationships with users outside of smokejumping.
I
am passionate about smokejumping! I love jumping fires! But I think it is
critical that we don’t lose sight of the fact that the reality is pretty clear;
only a percentage of our year is spent jumping fires and we need to diversify
and network as much as possible within the national fire program if we want to
strengthen our own.
Parachute
Systems
This
brings me to my last point, the square versus round debate, and the Forest
Service’s possible transition to the ram-air parachute. At this point I have
personally chosen to remain on the round system.
The
ram-air parachute is expensive. Management has said that the transition to the
square parachute would cost the program approximately $12 million over 10
years. Currently the Redmond base is as small as they’ve ever been. The rumors
abound that Redmond and NCSB are both facing serious budget constraints, that Missoula
may absorb West Yellowstone in the future, and that Redding has a retention
problem. Missoula is ~20 people
fewer than when I started. Every district in the country is slashing jobs and
equipment. Even our own Regional Office is talking about moving employees from
their downtown office to the Aerial Fire Depot to free up lease dollars. How, in light of this economic downturn
and governmental shift towards “cost savings” and budget cuts, can we
realistically be arguing for such an expensive system? Is it not fiscal
irresponsibility?
Also,
where is the guarantee of this $12 million in financial support? Is this
support still going to be available 5 years into this transition if the Forest
Service continues to slash budgets, personnel and equipment nationwide? If our funding
stops, which is fairly plausible, or if our estimated cost of implementation is
inaccurate or insufficient, what are the chances that we’ll be able to move
forward on a system that is estimated to be 2-3 times more expensive than our
current one? Along those lines, what are the costs to the end-user after successful
implementation of the ram-air system? One of the strongest criticisms of the
smokejumper program from our users is our high cost. Are these users interested
in absorbing the additional costs of the ram-air system when they see no added
value from it? They ultimately don’t care how we get there; they care about a
particular problem we solve for them. This pot of money addresses the
transition to the system, but doesn’t adequately address the expenses after
implementation or address how districts will be saddled with the burden after
the fact.
Almost
everyone I’ve talked to flying a ram-air parachute thinks that improvements need
to be made to the current 3 evaluation canopies. Why would you adopt, pay for and
transition to a system when it is not a finished product? Do people fail to
realize that we have the ultimate freedom and latitude right now to explore
these problems, their solutions and alternatives? We have the ability to test
new systems, new canopies, new products, different manufacturers and
developers. When we adopt a system, won’t we be transitioning to “The System”? A
system that it seems like, we’re increasingly not all that excited about. It
will be infinitely harder to correct or change systems down the road if we make
a commitment to something that doesn’t currently meet our needs.
The
training and loft requirements are significantly higher. The majority of the
square jumpers that I’ve talked to have expressed the need for more training
jumps relative to a round to remain as proficient. This is to be expected; it
is a much more technical parachute system. The learning curve for flying the ram-air
is steeper and some of our most experienced jumpers experience significant
challenges during both training and on operational fire jumps. In addition, numerous high and low
speed malfunctions requiring reserve deployments require additional training. Since
Missoula began evaluating the ram-air we’ve watched the man-hours dedicated to the
loft and training skyrocket. Between ram-air refresher, new man ram-air
training, train-the-trainer courses, harness manufacturing, commitments to
Alaska and Boise for continued training after certification and continued
testing and evaluation of the 3 different canopies, the time commitment is
significant. As we move forward with the transition, Missoula’s employees will
be traveling to, and training other jumpers around the country. As it is there
are only a limited number of people available for district (local project) work
outside of the base and that number will decrease for the foreseeable future. Isn’t
our real mission fire suppression, prescribed fire, fuels projects, hazardous
fuel reduction, duty officer assignments, tree climbing, team assignments, etc?
This is an enormous opportunity cost that few seem to acknowledge. Our users, (and
the Forest Service), needs smokejumpers and leaders in the field, not in the
loft and under canopy.
Another
negative impact of the transition is the possible elimination of the detailer
program. Missoula typically trains several temporary detailers from around the
country annually. These individuals are critical to the success of the program
and have proven to be very valuable proponents and users of smokejumpers time
and time again. They learn about the capabilities of the smokejumper program
and then return to their home units armed with that knowledge and their relationships
formed during the detail. Will this program continue to exist if we transition
to the ram-air?
I
have yet to be presented with a solid list of advantages that the ram-air
canopy has over the round; the exceptions being the RSL (reserve static line
deployment) and the AAD (automatic activation device) systems used with the
square. Could these systems not be integrated into a round canopy at a relative
cost? Why are we still using the antiquated Capewell system on the round
instead of a three-ring release system? Can we not integrate the RSL system
into our existing reserve/main? Why can’t we use an AAD on a round?
Yes
the square can handle higher winds. In ~60 operational fire jumps I’ve been
winded out 2 times, and I’ve landed moving backwards maybe a few more. More
typically it seems that if rounds don’t jump, squares don’t jump either. If
they do jump, we reinforce them the next morning when conditions are more
favorable. I’ve been on several fires where rounds have jumped and the squares
didn’t due to the limitations of the cloud ceiling. They typically came back
later in the day or the next morning to support us. This argument seems like a moot
point?
Mid-air
collisions on Forest Service round canopies are extremely rare. While they have
happened, several with severe consequences, these mid-air collisions have typically
been the result of pilot error and a lack of situational awareness, not
equipment failure or parachute malfunction. While one can gain more vertical
separation when using a square parachute, which would theoretically minimize the
risk of a “mid-air”, jumpers are humans and will make mistakes. I have seen several
square jumpers do one too many bomb turns in the name of vertical separation, ultimately
resulting in an altitude insufficient to make the jump spot. A mid-air collision
on a ram-air has a high probability of disastrous consequences, severe injury and
possible death for both jumpers involved. Mid-airs on a round canopy are fairly
common in military mass-exit troop deployment, and are statistically proven to
only rarely result in a collapsed canopy, a fatality or even an injury. Forest
Service round jumpers typically jump two at a time and horizontal separation
and airspace issues should be a non-factor for a well trained jumper. If a
particular jump spot is so small that air space will be an issue then we should
be jumping single person sticks regardless of the canopy.
Malfunction
rates on a round compared to a square are simply incomparable. The malfunctions
that do occur on a round are almost exclusively slow speed in nature and do not
require a reserve deployment. The most common malfunction, and a rare one at
that, is a broken steering line resulting in a slow turn in one direction.
Jumpers are taught to utilize “riser turns” to counteract this slow turn. It is
typical to do at least one practice jump per season using only the risers to
steer. This provides a controlled
training simulation for this particular malfunction. Steering line malfunctions
on ram-air parachutes induce a fast and uncontrollable spin requiring an
unstable reserve deployment. Ram-air parachutes are susceptible to a wider range
and a greater number of malfunctions.
The vast majority of those malfunctions require reserve deployment. That’s
simply not an acceptable level of risk for me.
Many
of our jump spots on forests throughout the country involve penetrating a
fairly tight canopy. It is significantly more challenging to sink a square
parachute vertically. The ram-air parachute requires forward air speed to fly
with stability; as you decrease forward air speed, you decrease stability,
increasing risk as the potential of stalling the canopy rises. As ram-air canopies stall, they begin
falling backwards and the only course of action is to increase forward air speed,
often resulting in surging, abrupt and swift forward acceleration. This typically occurs at very low
elevations and on the final descent.
The consequences can be severe and unforgiving.
One
can have softer landings on the ram-air canopy if the canopy is flared well in
favorable winds. Complaints of hard landings on the round canopy are common
with our larger jumpers. Our current large round canopy was designed with a
specified weight limit. If we are meeting
or exceeding these specifications, we need to manufacture an extra large
canopy. The alternative to a soft ram-air landing can be much worse than a hard
round landing however, and often results in significant physical injury, a higher
potential for paralysis and the possibility of death in extreme cases. Simple
physics can easily explain the concept that seems lost on so many.
Kinetic
energy is the measurement of energy in motion. Mechanism of Injury, and the
associated blunt force trauma, is directly correlated to the kinetic energy experienced
during an accident. The key component here is velocity; it’s important because as
speed increases it is squared!
KE=1/2
*m*v2 where m is mass and v is velocity.
Lets
look at a 150 lb male. One jumper is on the square system and one on the round
system. The wind is 10 mph.
The
square has an approximate forward speed of 20mph, subtract the 10 and he is
traveling 10mph. If he’s a good pilot he should easily be able to flare his
chute on landing and have an easy, soft, slow speed landing.
The
round moving at 10mph forward speed is now traveling at 0mph. While he can’t flare,
he has no forward speed. If he
executes a good roll, the landing will be similarly straightforward with
slightly more vertical fall. The potential kinetic energy in both of these
landings is close with a slight edge to the round from a numbers perspective;
the edge going to the square if the pilot flares perfectly, due to decreased
vertical fall involved. The kinetic energy in each landing is low, probably between
0 and 30.
Now
lets look at the same two jumpers. This time they both get caught off guard
with a 180 degree, 10 mph wind switch at their backs.
The
round is running with a tailwind, moving 20mph, with velocity squared of 400
and with kinetic energy of 300. He’s in for a hard landing, and the risk for
injury is fairly high.
The
ram-air pilot loses his ability to flare due to his speed relative to the wind speed
and he’s now moving close to 30 mph. His velocity squared is 900 compared to
400 on the round! His kinetic
energy in turn is 675 versus 300 for the round! The ram-air’s probability of
injury is significantly higher than that of the round because his kinetic
energy is greater than 2 times that of the round in this example!
Emts,
paramedics and doctors around the world rely on a “complete and accurate
account of the mechanism of injury” to predict injuries and treat trauma patients.
It should be obvious that there is a high probability for significant blunt
force traumatic injury to a jumper when he experiences a hard, high velocity
landing on a ram-air parachute. We’ve all witnessed this phenomenon, and we’ve all
seen even experienced square parachute pilots suffer high velocity landings. I
believe that our ram-air injury rates over the previous 5 years attest to this.
There is no denying that smokejumping is a somewhat dangerous mode of travel. There
are inherent risks when parachuting into unforgiving, harsh, rocky terrain
commonly accompanied by variable mountain winds. These risks increase significantly
when jumping a ram-air parachute.
I
shouldn’t even have to mention the 3 fatalities, Billy Martin, David Liston and
most recently Mark Urban, which have occurred on the ram-air system since 1990. The Bureau of Land Management smokejumper
program currently employees around 150 jumpers. Since 1990 their program has
experienced, on average, a fatality every 8 years. The USFS program employs approximately
300 jumpers. From past experience,
does it seem reasonable that the Smokejumper program as a whole, might
experience 2 fatalities every 8 years if the Forest Service transitions to the
ram-air? What would happen to our
program if we adopt this parachute and 4 years from now had a fatality,
paralysis or severely debilitating injury to one of our jumpers? Can the
program survive an incident like this? Can we accept that as a cost of doing
business? I can’t envision a transition back to the round after a serious
incident, years into funding, with a program wide commitment to a new parachute.
This doesn’t even account for the more hazardous, technical jump country found
in Regions 1, 5 and 6 versus the BLM’s jump country. If we are willing to accept
these increased risks, what are the real, actual, tangible advantages of the
ram-air system? I want to see concrete evidence and explicit explanations for
why this canopy is better than the one we’re currently on.
Ultimately,
as I write this, I realize that little of why I am so passionate about the
smokejumper program has anything to do with the parachute or parachuting. While
I do parachute 15 to 20 times a year, I don’t necessarily consider myself an
expert parachutist. Professional parachutists parachute for a living, they jump
multiple times every day; many make thousands of jumps annually. Some accrue tens
of thousands of jumps during their career. They are the best canopy pilots in
the world and they pursue new technologies and innovation as an industry. We are simply firefighters that
parachute. Does the USDA and the Forest Service really want to delve into
parachute development, design and testing for such a niche group of users,
which are increasingly getting used less and less by districts around the
country? Are we willing to sacrifice professional development to become more
focused parachutists?
Closing
I’ve
loved living the life of a smokejumper. The people, the places, the
experiences, the opportunities, the adventure; the skills, the training, the
challenges, the obstacles, the fears and the insight that I’ve gained while
employed as a smokejumper have given me an acute appreciation of what one is
truly capable of if one puts their mind to it. I typically spend less than 20
minutes a year under canopy, but spend close to 6 months of my life away from
home, dedicated to fire and the travel and the lifestyle associated with it. During
that 6-month period I spend close to 100 days on active fire assignments and
work nearly 800 hours of overtime, filling a variety of roles while making
significant sacrifices to other aspects of my personal and professional life. I
enjoy the small initial attack fires with close friends, but I also grow from
the challenges, personal tests and complexities found in incident command and on
large project fires. I want to see this program move healthily forward into the
future while providing it’s employees with the career opportunities and support
that they deserve. The Smokejumper program is, at its core, the strongest
Professional Development Program in the Forest Service, and in my opinion, one
of the strongest in the country outside of the military. Individuals that leave
the Smokejumper program go on to become extremely strong leaders, mentors and
role models throughout this country.
They pursue a wide range of careers from national incident managers and
fire leaders to politicians to scientists to private business owners and
entrepreneurs. I think it’s
critical that we don’t lose sight of what this program really means to most of
us; while truly recognizing how fragile it may really be.
Jon Marshall
MSO
‘04
